Chapter 3

Lumière, Camera, Azione!

The Personnel and Practices of Hollywood’s Mode of International Production

As Hollywood filmmakers gained more experience abroad over the years, they devised various production strategies that could be shared with one another. A case in point: in May 1961, Vincente Minnelli was preparing the production of Two Weeks in Another Town (1962), part of which he planned to shoot in Rome. Hollywood filmmaker Jean Negulesco communicated with Minnelli, offering some advice on working in Italy, where Negulesco had directed portions of Three Coins in the Fountain (1954) and Boy on a Dolphin (1957) and at the time was producing his next film, Jessica (1962):

I would say that the most difficult and the most important condition of making a picture in Italy is to adapt yourself to their spirit, to their way of life, to their way of working. A small example: This happened to me on location. As I arrive on the set and everything is ready to be done at 9 o’clock—the people are having coffee. Now, your assistant also is having coffee—and if you are foolish enough to start to shout and saying you want to work, right away you’ll have an unhappy crew and not the cooperation needed for the picture. But if you have coffee with them, they will work for you with no time limit or no extra expense.¹

Negulesco’s letter underscores a key lesson that Hollywood moviemakers learned overseas when confronted with different working hours, production practices, and cultural customs. Rather than resisting these differences, the director recommends a modicum of adaptability to elicit the hard work and unregulated, long hours certain Hollywood filmmakers expected overseas. The practice of adaptability was crucial to making Hollywood-style movies abroad and a development on the mass production of films in the studio.
system. In Hollywood, studios had created a specific division of labor and a set of craft practices that had governed filmmaking for decades. However, reflecting Negulesco’s advice to adapt to local circumstances, Hollywood’s postwar international productions operated in a more versatile mode, as filmmakers continued established studio-system practices while adjusting to foreign industries and locations. The Hollywood mode of production, which balanced standardization and differentiation, had always allowed for a degree of adaptability to respond to changes in technology and the need to innovate. Overseas, though, working in a more adjustable manner was not only an overarching method but also exemplified Hollywood’s global production strategy, which simultaneously reshaped foreign practices and complied with them. One goal of this process was to continue making films that adhered to Hollywood’s aesthetic conventions while also exploiting the appeal of foreign locations.

Building on the analysis of Hollywood’s use of film infrastructure in the United Kingdom, Italy, and France, this chapter considers the impact of human agency by exploring the personnel and craft practices that typified production in these countries. These characteristics of international production included the increased importance of location production management; the cooperation of Hollywood and foreign personnel; the need to facilitate effective communication among multilingual crews; the intermixing of Hollywood and foreign production practices; the sharing of production knowledge as overseas experience accumulated; and a degree of supervision of runaway productions by studio management based in Los Angeles. In analyzing these features, this chapter takes the perspective of Hollywood filmmakers to show how they navigated new working environments. A key tactic that emerges is the kind of adaptability that Negulesco was advocating. Reflecting the transcultural nature of an international mode of production, this viewpoint is balanced by considering the contributions of foreign crews and their film practices. The goal is to explain how these crews both determined and were affected by what Hollywood filmmakers were doing, a dynamic that was simultaneously reciprocal and a consequence of how Hollywood exerted its production power.

**LOCATION PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT**

In the Hollywood studio system, the organization of individual film shoots was overseen by a production manager, who took care of preproduction
arrangements, and an assistant director, who supported the director during shooting. For foreign work, a unit production manager (UPM) with enhanced authority was sent to the filmmaking site to begin preplanning with the assistance of a foreign office or studio. The UPM stayed in frequent contact with studio production supervisors in Hollywood via telegraph messages and letters to update them on matters such as frozen funds, foreign labor, and the coordination of locations. Once shooting commenced, the unit manager was responsible for ensuring that all of these preparations functioned smoothly.

As production managers accrued enough experience overseas, they became highly valuable to studios, moving from one international production to another. One key Hollywood production manager upon whom Paramount Studios relied was C. O. “Doc” Erickson (fig. 8). He had risen through the ranks of Paramount’s production department in the late 1940s, and by the mid-1950s had reached the level of UPM. He developed a specialization in location work after serving as production manager on a series of off-the-lot shoots, including *Shane* (1953), filmed in Wyoming, and *Secret of the Incas* (1954), shot in Peru. These productions initiated him to the challenges of working in remote locales and prepared him to organize the French location work on Alfred Hitchcock’s *To Catch a Thief* (1955). With a great deal of responsibility, the up-and-coming production manager recalled that the shoot on the French Riviera “was a huge jump forward for me, working in a foreign country and a distant location, and all the good and bad points of doing that.”

Erickson’s organizational skills, steady temperament, and commitment to both studio and director proved critical to the operation of *To Catch a Thief*. In February 1954, Erickson began preparations in Hollywood for organizing the French unit. He conferred with Bill Mull, the production manager on *Little Boy Lost* (1953), and studied correspondence from that earlier film to determine the procedures for shooting on French locations. Then in France, he worked with Paramount’s Paris office and French production managers to hire local labor, secure equipment, and negotiate with authorities. As preproduction got under way, Erickson’s diligence extended to keeping the studio informed of logistical developments. Without a doubt, he remained a dedicated company man. He apprised Paramount, “I hope we are keeping you sufficiently informed of our operational plans and progress and that you are getting all the information you desire. If not, please let me know and we’ll try to do better.” Paramount subsequently asked Erickson to wire the studio with updates every other day once shooting commenced. His regular
communication continued when the first unit returned to Hollywood, and he remained in the south of France to manage the second unit. As a key force in organizing Paramount’s overseas productions, Erickson was essential to mounting foreign location shoots while keeping the studio’s interests in mind.

While Hollywood often dispatched abroad studio production managers like Erickson, certain film units also recruited foreign personnel to organize filmmaking matters. For shoots in the UK, the production manager was often British, since labor restrictions dictated that only a small percentage of the crew could be foreign. On *Little Boy Lost*, in accordance with French union regulations, the Hollywood unit manager, Bill Mull, was balanced by a French unit manager named Michel Rittener. Both were in charge of securing equipment, locations, and permits. As Hollywood producers became more familiar with local crews, they began to depend increasingly on foreign
production managers, such as Julien Derode, who worked on Warner’s *The Nun’s Story* (1959) and Fox’s *Crack in the Mirror* (1960). Darryl Zanuck considered Derode one of the best European production managers, in part because Derode brought with him a crew accustomed to working together from film to film. Whether they were relying on UPMs from the United States or abroad, Hollywood companies needed these individuals to help get production off the ground and facilitate cooperation between Hollywood and foreign workers.

**The Mixing of Hollywood and Foreign Personnel**

Debates over how many Hollywood personnel to employ on international productions arose in the United States and overseas. Some filmmakers, such as Charles Vidor, made a case for importing a high number of Hollywood crew members to ensure better production efficiency, even if it cost more. As cinematographer Robert Surtees, who worked on numerous international productions, put it, “One American crew member is worth more to a production than all the inexperienced help recruited in the country where the picture is made.” Likewise, US film unions lobbied producers to take large Hollywood crews on foreign location treks. Initially some studios adhered to this Hollywood-centric approach, much to the approval of the unions. In IATSE’s official publication, *International Photographer*, several reports on large-scale epics such as *Helen of Troy* (1956), *Land of the Pharaohs* (1955), and *The Ten Commandments* (1956) highlighted the reliance on Hollywood crews for overseas shoots despite the sometimes-high transportation costs. For Fox’s early slate of postwar foreign productions, the quantity of studio personnel sent overseas resulted in a temporary depletion of the Fox lot’s staff.

Nonetheless, Hollywood companies capped the number of employees they brought to Europe, not only because they planned to hire cheaper, local skilled labor but also because European unions limited the importation of workers from the United States. In Britain, the Association of Cinematographers (ACT) union was disconcerted by the potential influx of Hollywood technicians. Jonathan Stubbs has shown that ACT president Anthony Asquith voiced a nationalist concern over Hollywood’s incursions into British filmmaking and the resulting production of decidedly British
subject matter such as *Captain Horatio Hornblower* (1951).\(^{15}\) Despite fears about the loss of work to Hollywood personnel, certain British workers profited from the presence of Hollywood in the UK at a time when film-sector unemployment was growing. Cinematographer Oswald Morris recollected that some British technicians welcomed companies such as MGM, since they were pouring money into big-budget productions and giving them an opportunity to learn.\(^{16}\)

At first, US and British labor groups attempted reciprocity agreements, in which Hollywood workers could go overseas in exchange for British personnel coming to Hollywood.\(^{17}\) The agreements aimed to support swapping Hollywood and British art directors and cinematographers for studio visits and filmmaking assignments on productions such as Fox’s *The Mudlark* (1950).\(^{18}\) The trading of talent also extended to acting, as the British Film Producers Association (BFPA) encouraged Hollywood actors working in England to join the British Equity union and British actors in Hollywood to similarly enlist in the Screen Actors Guild.\(^{19}\) To many British personnel, the ability to work in Hollywood was very attractive. In addressing the British Society of Cinematographers, president Freddie Young promoted these agreements by appealing to notions of internationalism: “I think it a splendid idea that the creators of Motion Pictures, such as directors, writers, art directors, directors of photography, and others should be allowed to circulate freely and not be confined within the limits of their own countries.”\(^{20}\) Despite Young’s call for a swapping of workers, the agreements were never fully realized, as they encountered labor protectionist measures on both sides of the Atlantic.

To safeguard the employment of British citizens in the motion picture industry, Britain’s Ministry of Labour enacted some of the strictest regulations in Europe. In 1948, during the upsurge in British production by Hollywood companies, the BFPA limited the importation of Hollywood personnel to only a handful of producers and directors.\(^{21}\) The British Actors Equity Association also restricted the number of actors brought over from the United States, especially to play British roles.\(^{22}\) Hollywood technicians faced even greater impediments. On *The Miniver Story* (1950), made at MGM’s Borehamwood studio, Hollywood director of photography Joseph Ruttenberg was able to work on the film only after the British-born and Hollywood-based actress Greer Garson threatened to walk off the film if he was not hired. In addition, a standby British cinematographer had to be employed.\(^{23}\)

Over the course of the 1950s, Hollywood studios and British unions engaged in frequent negotiations over the importation of Hollywood talent.
Finally, a 1957 agreement between Hollywood’s MPEA and Britain’s ACT stipulated that US companies could export up to twelve Hollywood producers or directors a year for films that qualified for the British quota. However, the regulation did not apply to films that cost more than $840,000 if a British producer, associate producer, or director was involved.24 In theory, the British Ministry of Labour in consultation with British unions aimed to grant foreign work permits to one or two lead actors and the producer or director. In practice, Hollywood firms and British unions arbitrated on a case-by-case basis.25

Despite the British industry’s reliance on Hollywood production to keep studios open and workers employed, Hollywood companies encountered some resistance from local labor groups. During MGM’s concurrent British productions of Crest of the Wave, Flame and the Flesh, and Knights of the Round Table in 1953, about two hundred individuals from the extras’ union walked off all three films in protest over MGM’s unwillingness to increase wages beyond an initial scale agreement after a group of extras on Knights of the Round Table complained about having to work long hours in heavy armored suits. The BFPA supported MGM by refusing to hire the hundreds of extras who boycotted the films until the situation was resolved. The walk-out soon spread to other British studios when the Film Artistes Association, which represented the extras, retaliated by calling on more extras to strike. After a monthlong standoff, MGM finally capitulated and agreed to meet the extras’ call for a pay raise.26

In France, segments of the film industry objected to the potential influx of Hollywood productions due to the strong influence of Communism in French film unions and a strain of anti-US sentiment that surfaced in the late 1940s. This stance arose in reaction to the threat of cultural domination prompted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Marshall Plan, and the Blum-Byrnes film accord, which enabled the free flow of US films into France.27 Moreover, the Benagoss–Union générale cinématographique pact of 1949 aided the production of Franco-US films in France, much to the discontent of the Communist-controlled Confédération générale du travail (CGT) union, which favored supporting purely domestic work.28 To regulate the possible flood of US film labor into France, French unions pressured the Centre national de la cinématographie to refuse filming permits to foreign productions unless a high number of French workers were used. The unions also required that any crew member brought from Hollywood be matched with a local worker of the same position, a procedure known
as featherbedding. In practice, the French unions were open to negotiating the balance of Hollywood and French personnel, although they were more sensitive to protecting the employment of French cameramen. As Hollywood firms began to recognize the strengths of French technicians, these companies reduced the number of US crew members to avoid featherbedding costs.

The production situation was also tricky in Italy, where Hollywood was mounting some of its largest foreign operations. The reliance on local infrastructure and the importation of Hollywood crews were therefore heavy. In 1949, an alliance of cinematographers at first threatened to ban technicians coming from Hollywood for fear of being inundated with US workers. Over time, though, the Italian foreign labor restrictions were nominal. Italian cinematographer Sergio Salvati explained that Hollywood personnel were welcome in Italy given the epic size of the productions and the opportunities for Italian workers.

Nevertheless, relations with Italian film labor could be tense. On some of the larger Italian productions, Hollywood companies had to navigate the requirements of large labor pools. For *Quo Vadis* (1951), MGM had to work with two labor unions. A committee charged with hiring Italian workers at Cinecittà was made up of representatives from both the Federazione Italiana Lavoratori dello Spettacolo (FILS), the Communist-controlled union, and the Federazione Unitaria Lavoratori dello Spettacolo (FULS), the non-Communist union. The US Embassy in Rome encouraged the production to use the non-Communist option for fear of generating bad publicity in the United States and Italy. Screenwriter Hugh Gray recalled that once filming commenced, the unions carried out “lightning strikes” (short-lived stretches of inactivity) to protest the production’s working conditions. Years later, on Fox’s *Cleopatra* (1963), the FULS labor union called for a halt to all of the studio’s productions in Italy because of the many contract-violation suits filed against the Fox operation and because more than one hundred Hollywood technicians were apparently brought to work on the film. The FULS-led protest was likely spurred on because Fox hired most of its Italian crew from the Communist FILS union, much to the consternation of the US Embassy in Rome and the outcry of the American Federation of Labor’s Hollywood Film Council.

Due to the convergence of foreign union demands and the need for cheaper labor costs, the below-the-line crew on continental shoots was mostly European. However, Hollywood studios could exert their influence logisti-
cally by working within this labor structure and assigning Hollywood personnel to the roles of department heads to bring the ranks of each department in line with Hollywood production practices. European union dictates could balance this hierarchy by matching a department head—say, a key grip—with a bilingual foreign counterpart—another key grip—who could communicate with the foreign crew. The technical requirements of Hollywood production, however, required film companies to bring US crew members with specialized skills that could not be found in Europe. To execute specific cinematographic techniques, Hollywood sent over camera technicians. For example, the VistaVision shooting of *To Catch a Thief*, *The Man Who Knew Too Much* (1956), and *Funny Face* (1957) all called for largely Hollywood camera crews. In time, though, the specialization in Hollywood technology and style spread through European crews. As wide-screen filmmaking grew in Europe during the 1950s, studios could look to European technicians who had training in shooting wide-screen formats. Additionally, as studios became more familiar with European talent over time, established cinematographers such as Giuseppe Rotunno and Jack Cardiff, and art directors such as Alexandre Trauner, served as department heads.

For other specialized roles, Hollywood productions relied on certain bilingual foreign individuals, reemploying some of the most reputed from film to film. Multilingual script supervisor Sylvette Baudrot was one of those French workers who was able to move among Hollywood’s overseas shoots (fig. 9). While training to be a “script girl” in the French film industry, she met French production managers Christian Ferry, Julien Derode, and Paul Feyder, who would all go on to serve on many Hollywood productions and help her obtain employment. “It was a sort of a network that brought me a tremendous amount of work between the 1950s and the 1970s,” Baudrot recalled. On her first Hollywood project, *To Catch a Thief*, Baudrot’s job was one of the positions that the film shoot doubled up on. While the first unit filmed, she shadowed Claire Behnke, the script supervisor brought over from Hollywood. Baudrot studied how Behnke maintained continuity and filled out production reports. When Behnke and much of the Hollywood crew returned to Los Angeles to film interiors, Baudrot took over the role of script supervisor for the second-unit work. Her ability to navigate multiple languages and production methods contributed in important ways to Hollywood’s capacity to film in France. After working on *To Catch a Thief*, she went on to assist many Hollywood directors, including Richard Fleischer, Vincente Minnelli, Stanley Donen, Gene Kelly, George Stevens, and Jean...
Negulesco, on locations throughout Europe. Baudrot’s career demonstrates that the sharing of talent became an integral way for units shooting overseas to preserve some stability from one film to the next.

One of the attractions for Hollywood companies to operate out of London, Paris, and Rome was that in general a film production’s division of
labor in those industries was similar to Hollywood’s labor organization, though in Italy the demarcation lines of responsibilities could be looser. However, a notable exception was the gaffer, who was in charge of placing and rigging the lights on a set. In European craft traditions, the gaffer did not always exist, which meant that the director of photography had to light the set. French production manager Christian Ferry pointed out that the absence of gaffers was not just a matter of altered duties for the cinematographer, but also resulted in a loss of efficiency. Precious time was lost since a set could not be pre-lit before the cinematographer and cast arrived, which according to postwar French union regulations typically occurred at noon.

This change in work routine prompted Hollywood cinematographer Joseph Ruttenberg, who had shot MGM’s British production of *The Miniver Story*, to write in the pages of *American Cinematographer*, “Certain technicians in Hollywood would blush to see me swinging a lamp in place or moving cables, gobos and barn doors, as I frequently did on this picture.” Ruttenberg tried to offset this supposed demotion by reasserting his authority when he explained that he reorganized British “working procedures to more nearly conform with those followed in Hollywood.” Here, the cinematographer confirmed that when faced with altered work duties or a foreign crew unfamiliar with US methods, Hollywood technicians retrained below-the-line workers for increased production efficiency. By adapting to the specificity of foreign work duties while also training local crews, Hollywood personnel could exert their leverage and versatility.

Some Hollywood technicians acknowledged that one drawback of collaborating with foreign personnel who were not on long-term contracts was the lack of professional bonds that typically developed among crew members who worked together repeatedly. The time put into orienting new unit members potentially reduced efficiency. Ruttenberg assessed the British film industry along these lines:

Perhaps the greatest single factor that retards development of the technical side of the industry is [using] a different camera crew each time. In Hollywood, most directors of photography have the same camera and grip crews on every picture. In the British studios, the cinematographer invariably is given a new and strange crew of men, all of whom must acquaint themselves with the general working conditions and with the habits of the cinematographer to whom they are assigned. Working with Hollywood technicians, I think, has had tremendous influence on these men and the “team” idea seems to be catching on.
For decades, the culture of the Hollywood studio system was shaped by the cohesion that came with stable contracted labor. In time, though, Hollywood faced the situation Ruttenberg describes, as technicians lost their long-term studio contracts, resulting in a pool of freelance workers who moved from one project to another. Certainly, the employment of Hollywood and European workers reflected the 1950s move toward a package-unit system of production, in which producers assembled crews from this industry-wide reserve for each motion picture. But on foreign shoots, instead of the entire US industry serving as a source for labor, the world’s film industries served as one giant pool to pick from. The evidence of Hollywood’s growing international clout was exhibited in the industry’s ability to turn its mode of production into a more adjustable mechanism to take advantage of this global labor supply. One of the challenges was figuring out how to foster communication between Hollywood filmmakers and foreign crew members.

**COMMUNICATION**

Director Edward Dmytryk once remarked, “In his own homeland, a director must only put up with the inconsistencies of his own tongue. On alien ground, he must deal with the alien language.”\(^{47}\) With film workers of different nationalities working together and facing potential language barriers, how did Hollywood personnel and foreign crews communicate in order to execute the heavy demands of international production work?\(^ {48}\) After all, language lies at the heart of the filmmaking process, shaping the countless decisions made on a film set. Language informs creative options, like a director’s ability to convey how to stage an action. It influences logistics, for example an assistant director’s command of a set. Language informs technical matters, such as the discussion of lenses among the camera team. Any breakdown in communication risks shooting delays, mistakes, and even accidents—all potential pitfalls in the technically complicated work of filmmaking.

Anecdotes about the polyglot nature of Hollywood’s international productions tend to treat language barriers as disturbances in the filmmaking operation. Discussing the obstacles of working overseas, producer William Perlberg explained, “One of our biggest headaches was the language barrier. Even in English (and this can happen in Hollywood), instructions passed along through three or four channels are apt to wind up with distortion. But, with a babel of tongues they can wind up in chaos.”\(^ {49}\) Language differences
also resulted in simple misunderstandings. Director Joshua Logan relates how on the French location shoot of *Fanny* (1961), during a silent scene, he called out to actress Leslie Caron to “look up!” Immediately, the French “clapper boy,” thinking the director had called out *le clap* (the French word for the slate) ran into the shot, ruining the take. Given that the profession relies on thousands of specialized terms, linguistic confusions unsurprisingly arose on international productions. As a sign of the need to foster effective communication among multilingual crews, the *Journal of the Society of Motion Picture and Television Engineers* in 1956 produced a list of technical terms in English, Spanish, French, Italian, and German. A few years later, a French-English motion picture technical dictionary was published.

Language barriers could also interrupt the production workflow. During the Italian location shoot for *September Affair* (1951), miscommunication prevented certain Hollywood technicians from distributing the workload to the Italian crew members. An assistant to the film’s producer observed, “A great deal of the work cannot be allocated to others, as it continually means interpreters and interpretation, which never get the results. . . . The explanation is seemingly understood, but somehow and somewhere the operation is not successfully concluded or in some cases not even done.” In this case, the communication breakdown hindered a core organizing principle in Hollywood filmmaking: production efficiency. Language differences therefore posed a major hurdle to the smooth operation of overseas productions, as spoken directions either went through an interpreter, underwent a slow process of gesture and mimicry, or became lost in translation. While the Hollywood division of labor had always aimed to ease the flow of communications, the different languages on international productions complicated this process. There were three possible solutions: hire interpreters, employ multilingual foreign workers, or import Hollywood personnel familiar with the local language.

Using interpreters met with mixed results. Interpreters did ease communication among crew members, as was the case on the Paris location shoot for *The Man on the Eiffel Tower* (1950), where director of photography Stanley Cortez relied on an interpreter to work with his largely French crew. For Hollywood’s East Asian productions, language barriers were stronger and interpreters were in greater demand, but their insertion into the chain of communication could result in mistakes. On *Soldier of Fortune* (1955), which was shot in Hong Kong and Macao, Edward Dmytryk discovered that much of what an interpreter had translated was incorrect. The director
reasoned, “Blame it on the ambiguity of the language, or on the fact that almost everyone knows how to do it better than you do . . . this problem is universal. Whether the language was Italian, Hungarian, or Hebrew, local interpreters were frequently inexact.” In addition to these hazards of mistranslation and the resulting slowdowns in production, hiring interpreters also inflated the foreign unit budget.

Hiring multilingual foreign workers proved more efficient and cost-effective. Bilingual technicians were thus much sought after. In Italy, two US producers took advantage of this need by setting up a talent agency in Rome to scout English-speaking actors and crew members for Hollywood productions. More often, in order to find bilingual talent, film companies relied on studios’ network of foreign offices and reliable local organizers who knew the industry well. For the French locations of *Little Boy Lost*, Edouard de Segonzac of Paramount’s Paris office recommended looking for key English-speaking French personnel rather than using interpreters. In hiring international workers, language ability therefore became a new commodity alongside technical know-how. Amid the correspondence for *Little Boy Lost*, a list of French personnel identifies individuals and their language skills. Assistant director Michel J. Boisrond is described as an “excellent fellow—speaks English well and knows picture problems.” Assistant cameraman Jean Benezech is characterized as a “jolly good worker—understands English—lots of fun.” Transportation worker Hamlet Barbadoro “has own trucks—gets your equipment there on time—very dependable, which is something—all he can say is ‘Let’s go.’”

Even though Hollywood companies hoped for as many multilingual foreign workers as possible, some roles, such as assistant directors, warranted English-language proficiency more than others, since these positions could serve as liaisons between the above-the-line Hollywood personnel and the below-the-line foreign staff. Positions involved with dialogue required a strong grasp of the language, too. As one of the few English-speaking script supervisors in France, Sylvette Baudrot was guaranteed steady work on Hollywood productions. She grew up in the cosmopolitan city of Alexandria, Egypt, and had learned to speak Arabic, French, Italian, and English—all languages that served her well during the growth of postwar international moviemaking.

Foreign production heads, such as cinematographers and art directors, often required some knowledge of English since they collaborated directly with Hollywood filmmakers. However, Italian cinematographer Giuseppe
Rotunno recounted that having only worked with Italian directors such as Luchino Visconti, he had just a smattering of English when he started working with Hollywood filmmakers like Samuel Taylor on *The Monte Carlo Story* (1957) and Henry Koster on *The Naked Maja* (1959). While he remembered some interpreters facilitating communication on set, the common ground was always the script and the story.60

Multilingual production materials were vital to international crews. To enable individuals of different nationalities to work together, production reports and script breakdowns were often printed in both English and the local language on the same pages, while shooting scripts were translated into different language versions.61 Based on his experience with foreign crews, business manager Henry Henigson made a strong case to William Wyler in preparation for *Roman Holiday* (1953): “Scripts intended for foreign production should be much more fully written than they usually are when intended for production at home. The translation should be so detailed that even the foreigner who is forced to work by it will have in his mind a very clear picture of our intentions.”62 In this era of transcultural productions, paperwork, which had long made the Hollywood production process more efficient, now in translated form contributed to uniting crews divided by language.

Though not the norm, overseas productions sometimes relied on multilingual personnel from Hollywood. In response to the increasing internationalization of production work, language schools targeted the Hollywood community. In the mid-1950s, advertisements for the Berlitz Schools of Languages, which had various locations throughout Los Angeles County, began to appear in the pages of *Daily Variety*, aimed at Hollywood filmmakers planning to work abroad (fig. 10). Using a dapper-looking cartoon character in a pith helmet with a rifle in a vaguely exotic scene, the ads pitched language acquisition as a skill necessary to surviving the perils of working overseas.63 Another school, the Polyglot Institute in Los Angeles, aimed to teach languages to filmmakers using a rather dubious technique. The head of the institute, Michel Thomas, a Frenchman who had studied psychology in Paris and Vienna, maintained that he could instill in his students conversational and reading knowledge in any language in just twenty hours of class time by using therapeutic techniques that tapped into the subconscious. According to Thomas, director Daniel Mann was able to discuss one of his films with a French person in French after only five hours of language learning.64

Just as foreign crew members used English-speaking skills to gain employment, Hollywood workers could tout a knack for language to secure
work abroad. During the early hiring process for MGM’s Quo Vadis, workers in the Los Angeles area who knew Italian wrote to John Huston, who was then assigned to direct the film. The Puerto Rican actor Alberto Morin, who had lived in Italy and taken part in the Italian campaign during World War II, spoke fluent Italian and offered his general services to the director. Morin had previously worked at Twentieth Century-Fox teaching Italian to the crew of Prince of Foxes (1949) in preparation for its shoot in Italy. Query letters like Morin’s are indicative of the transitional phase that Hollywood was undergoing in the late 1940s and into the 1950s as studio employees lost the stability of long-term contracts and moved into freelance status, which meant they had to find work through solicitation and networking.
When discussing the language abilities of Hollywood personnel, we should remember that the US film industry was filled with foreign émigrés and exiles. These filmmakers’ move into postwar international production was something of a return to their roots, though they did not always work in their countries of birth or in their heritage languages. Although fluent in German and French, the German-born William Wyler went to Italy for *Roman Holiday* and *Ben-Hur* (1959), while the German-born Billy Wilder returned to his native country for parts of *A Foreign Affair* (1948) and *One, Two, Three* (1961). The Ukrainian-born Anatole Litvak, who had directed films in Germany, France, and England before moving to the United States, made Paris his headquarters in the 1950s as he shot Hollywood productions across Europe. For the Franco-US production of *Act of Love* (1953), the multilingual director shot English and French versions of the film. Many technicians also emigrated to the United States and then returned to Europe for foreign location shoots. For Anatole Litvak’s European-set war film *Decision before Dawn* (1952), shot in Germany, German cinematographer Franz Planer was able to communicate with the crew in his native language.

While difficult, language differences were never insurmountable impediments, as Hollywood and foreign personnel adapted to each other’s methods and customs. Production manager “Doc” Erickson worked on many international productions, but he never mastered a foreign language. He indicated that with a couple of gestures and a few foreign words, production workers could understand one another. Whether a film relied on interpreters, English-speaking foreign personnel, or multilingual Hollywood workers—and some used all three—there was no clear standard for how an international production staff communicated. It varied not only from film to film but also from individual to individual. Just as the Hollywood mode of production became more fluid overseas by adapting to the features of foreign industries, communication among workers also became more variable. The role of languages on these sets was less about an intermixing of national identities than it was a transcultural mixing of film practices, in which foreign methods interacted with Hollywood techniques.

**PRODUCTION PRACTICES**

Another major hurdle of going abroad and working with foreign crews was that Hollywood filmmakers often found themselves confronting different
working methods. Within this altered filmmaking context, they had to maintain certain Hollywood practices in order to sustain large-scale production and ensure efficiency. At the same time, Hollywood filmmakers had to adapt to local circumstances based on foreign union regulations and the skills of local technicians. So, how were Hollywood production practices exported to overseas industries? What happened when these practices interacted with foreign methods?

Within the first few years of Hollywood’s move into European production, labor groups on both sides of the Atlantic made overtures to formalize an exchange of working methods through a number of measures. After a two-month European tour of foreign industries in 1950, Joseph Mankiewicz, then president of the Screen Directors Guild, sought to foster an interchange of directors and techniques between Europe and Hollywood. Although short-lived, the proposed reciprocity schemes between Hollywood and the UK served to facilitate sharing practices. In a 1948 issue of the British publication The Cine-Technician, various ACT members, under the aegis of the schemes, reported on their visits to Hollywood. They studied RKO Studios and remarked on the “speed and efficiency” of various film units and the distribution of script “breakdowns” across departments. In a similar vein, practices spread through articles printed in foreign industry publications about Hollywood methods and technologies, some written by Hollywood technicians. Correspondingly, in American Cinematographer and International Photographer, Hollywood technicians reported on their experiences of working overseas. However, an industry-sanctified trading of ideas was limited by each nation’s labor protectionist measures and a largely one-way flow of cooperation, as Hollywood gained a strong foothold in European industries while most European filmmakers and technicians remained in Europe.

The exchange of methods therefore happened on the ground during the production of Hollywood films in foreign lands. For instance, US producers sought to train foreign workers in accordance with Hollywood shooting procedures. While local unions frequently dictated the working day’s schedule, Hollywood filmmakers in the UK found that English workers fell in line with the pace of Hollywood production. After shooting Under Capricorn (1949) in England, Alfred Hitchcock, who was well established in both Hollywood and British industries, portrayed the increasing productivity of the British technicians: “They’re learning that they have to prepare for shooting more carefully than they have been. . . . They are anticipating difficulties.
now, rather than waiting until they come up on the sound stage. They told me they were impressed with the way I rehearsed the cast on one stage while the technicians lit up another.”

As an English-born-and-bred director, Hitchcock emerged as a booster of the methods of his adopted industry in the United States, now helping to spread Hollywood techniques back in Britain.

In Italy, Hollywood companies took advantage of a relatively inexpensive workforce who excelled in quality set and costume construction while also training the local crews. The training process became a primary means of promoting Hollywood’s ways. During the shooting phase of *Quo Vadis*, problems with organization and communication delayed filming progress until the MGM staff taught Italian technicians at Cinecittà to work in teams and the thousands of Italian extras to take directions in English. Reporting on the film’s production in the pages of *American Cinematographer*, director of photography Robert Surtees remarked, “Adapting the Italian worker to our methods and integrating him with our own studio-trained men was greatly a matter of education.” So a “school for electricians” was set up by the production’s Hollywood gaffer to train Italian crew members in Hollywood lighting methods. Once the staff from Hollywood upskilled the Italians, Surtees said that the Italian crew grew rapidly in efficiency.

While remolding foreign crews was a necessary part of working abroad, Surtees’s depiction of collaborating with local labor as a matter of reeducation reflected an ethnocentric stance common in the culture of Hollywood abroad and in the self-aggrandizing discourse of *American Cinematographer*. For foreign shoots outside of Europe, this rhetoric sometimes reflected a troubling colonialist attitude, in which Hollywood department heads expressed their need to train “native” casts and crews.

In France, the Paramount staff working on *Little Boy Lost* found that the French crew operated in a more relaxed manner, eliciting an adaptive approach to collaboration from the Hollywood personnel. Unit production manager Bill Mull assessed the French crew, declaring, “We are fairly well organized for shooting, but sometimes they frighten me with their two hours for lunch and the business establishment’s ‘don’t worry about anything’ attitude.” A week later, Mull’s attitude had shifted: “We are pretty well organized and when we get some good light we move fast. The French staff and crew have been hand picked, and once [they] understand what we want they are very efficient.” In due time, though, Mull admitted that the Hollywood workers “had to fall into their methods because they cannot change to ours.”
Minor differences in production practices also reflected European craft traditions that arose out of local filmmaking conditions, and Hollywood units learned to put to use these localized skills. During the second-unit photography in London on Paramount’s *Knock on Wood* (1954), Hollywood cinematographer William Williams looked to British technicians who had developed techniques for shooting in rain and fog and the ensuing dramatic shifts in light. Hollywood and foreign techniques could also intermix, resulting in a transcultural interchange of film practices. *Quo Vadis* art director Edward Carfagno claimed that he helped introduce the Italian set designers to the use of plastic in set construction. Conversely, the Italians showcased their own distinct methods. In creating a Roman arena for the film, the Italian set builders used a support structure called “sostacina” dating back to ancient Roman times, a procedure that impressed the Hollywood crew.

Some practices, namely working hours, were ingrained in foreign production cultures, which attempted to make Hollywood units conform to union-controlled regulations. But Hollywood producers sometimes managed to negotiate different work schedules. One practice that seemed nonnegotiable was the union-sanctioned tea break in Britain. For Hollywood filmmakers, this twice-a-day cultural custom broke up the momentum of a day’s schedule in the morning and the afternoon. During the filming of *The Hasty Heart* (1950) at the Associated British Picture Corporation (ABPC) studios, director Vincent Sherman was baffled by this interruption. He wrote to studio head Jack Warner in Burbank: “Just as we were ready to shoot—came a tea break. This meant that everybody, from electricians way up high on down—had to stop to get tea!! From the time that the tea break was called until the men got back, a half hour was consumed. Then the actors had to be warmed up again, and we finally got our first shot around 11 o’clock.” Bertram Tuttle, a Warner Bros. art director who later worked on *Captain Horatio Hornblower*, also at ABPC, described the ritual in more detail:

A waggon is wheeled in which is known as the tea-trolley and which has an entire crew devoted to its maintenance and manufacture of tea. Even though the cameras are perfectly set-up, the lighting is just right, the entire crew queue up at the tea-trolley, at which time, tea is served with rolls with sometimes an occasional Frankfurter managing to get in. After tea is served of course the entire crew goes back in a procession, but with the cup still in their hand. Now here is the big problem, you must be sure that your set is clear of empty tea cups before you get your shot. . . . The same entire manouevre *[sic]* occurs in the afternoon at 3 o’clock, the only big difference being in the afternoon—it is pastry.
The comments by Sherman and Tuttle point to an important aspect of working overseas: the interaction of Hollywood and foreign personnel and their respective working methods stood as a mixing of not just production practices but also cultural customs that could spur creativity, such as the methods of Italian set designers, or spark irritation, such as the British tea breaks. As Roger Corman, who shot a number of films overseas, put it, “The meeting of different cultures can be stimulating and exciting, but it can also lead to the most intense form of frustration.”

Hollywood companies learned to cope with the meeting of cultures by exporting filmmaking methods and incorporating foreign working procedures. This process of adaptation and reconfiguration suggests that at the level of day-to-day work, international productions were a striking instance of the transcultural flow of filmmaking customs.

PRODUCTION KNOWLEDGE

As John Caldwell has pointed out, in the Hollywood studio system “trade knowledge” circulated through craft training and apprenticeships down a “vertical hierarchy” of rank. In contrast, for postwar international work, vital production knowledge reflected the ecosystem of new filmmaking environments. Rather than moving in regulated ways down work hierarchies, Hollywood’s units abroad obtained experience in a piecemeal fashion. These experiences over time consolidated into wisdom to be shared with production departments in Hollywood and with competing units overseas. This distribution of production knowledge worked in a two-way, transcultural pattern. In order to acquire experience abroad, Hollywood companies learned through trial and error and by soliciting information from on-the-ground contacts. The transmission of knowledge also functioned the other way, as Hollywood filmmakers applied studio craft practices to international productions by exporting Hollywood department heads and training foreign workers. This exchange of trade knowledge reaffirmed the importance of an adaptable mode of production, in which Hollywood filmmakers gathered information about the film landscape abroad and then adjusted to this landscape while promoting their own craft practices.

As the phenomenon of international production grew in the late 1940s, Hollywood studios had to figure out how to initiate film shoots in areas that were new to production management. The foreign studio office could certainly
help organize preproduction on behalf of its home studio. But for some of the earliest postwar overseas productions, such as To the Victor (1948), film firms did not have the luxury of relying on their own previous experiences. Therefore, some studios turned to other production personnel working in Europe. For The Hasty Heart in England, Warner Bros. needed to figure out if the company was paying for costs at ABPC’s studio at the correct rates. So Warner sought feedback on a budget item list from the general manager of Teddington Studios and the production manager of Hitchcock’s Under Capricorn, which was then shooting at MGM’s British studios.85 The steep learning curve on The Hasty Heart caused Jack Warner to comment that the film “is sort of a proving ground and what we learn in this production is bound to help all those following—to their great benefit.”86

Over the years, certain Hollywood production organizers who specialized in international filmmaking or lived abroad became important contacts. These production organizers—MGM production manager William Kaplan (When in Rome [1952], The Last Time I Saw Paris [1954]), Fox production manager Robert Snody (Kangaroo [1952], The Snows of Kilimanjaro [1952]), and freelance production manager Lee Katz (Moby Dick [1956], The Longest Day [1962])—functioned as go-to people for guidance on working abroad. “Doc” Erickson recollected that for location surveys, he solicited production personnel who had worked abroad for information on potential shooting sites.87 By the late 1950s, the Unit Production Managers Guild formalized the distribution of overseas trade knowledge by compiling data on production resources in various regions around the globe. This information was made available to guild members and producers preparing to work overseas.88

Hollywood companies also relied on foreign contacts familiar with the customs and practices of each country or region. In the late 1940s, MGM looked to its Italian head of dubbing and sound in Rome to survey the local production landscape to determine the possibility of staging a major film like Quo Vadis in Italy.89 In preparing for location work in Marrakech for The Man Who Knew Too Much, the Paramount Paris office consulted with French director Jacques Becker, who had earlier made the film Ali Baba et les quarante voleurs (1954) in Morocco. He offered advice on shooting in the country and recommended reliable Moroccan assistants.90

In time, producers and studios learned to depend on their own past experiences of working overseas to organize their films. While each new international production encountered unique challenges that demanded new solutions, filmmaking abroad did not result in a total breakdown of standardized
procedure. In many cases, producers appealed to solutions that had worked in the past. Paramount assistant director Richard McWhorter, who helped organize Italian location shooting on *September Affair*, anticipated this point when he wrote to the studio: “[I] am sure that by the time we have finished shooting the picture, I will be able to help the next Company that goes to Italy, by discussing with them a few of the short cuts that I have found.” This kind of trade knowledge became integrated in each Hollywood crew member’s craft practice, to be shared and replicated on future productions.

The circulation of production knowledge, however, was not just about collecting information on methods discovered overseas; knowledge moved in the other direction by applying Hollywood know-how to international production work. Promoting Hollywood practices became especially important with the introduction of new technologies. One way for Hollywood studios to export their technology and style was to invite foreign production supervisors and technicians to Hollywood. With the unveiling of CinemaScope in 1953, Twentieth Century-Fox halted all of its British productions, since none of the studio’s British personnel were familiar with the new wide-screen format, so Fred Fox, the studio’s production chief in the UK, traveled to Hollywood to study the process. By 1955 Fox began to roll out the production of CinemaScope films in England with *The Deep Blue Sea* (1955). Before shooting his first VistaVision film in Rome, *War and Peace* (1956), British cinematographer Jack Cardiff spent several weeks in Hollywood researching the new format and running tests. As wide-screen filmmaking grew in Europe over the course of the 1950s, studios could turn to foreign cinematographers and crews who had been trained in these Hollywood methods. By training foreign labor, Hollywood’s international influence rested on its ability to maintain production efficiencies while meeting the needs of foreign industries that wanted to innovate.

To facilitate the distribution of production knowledge, communication via letter and telegram helped Hollywood learn about working conditions abroad and helped Hollywood filmmakers apply studio practices to foreign work. Even if communication by telephone was an option, transoceanic connections were unreliable, as MGM discovered while trying to set up a production base at Cinecittà for *Quo Vadis*. Telephone communication from locations outside metropolises was even more troublesome. Airmail, on the other hand, proved reliable, even when it took anywhere from five to nine days from Western Europe to Los Angeles. By some accounts, the duration of mail delivery from the West Coast to Europe was faster.
of messages sent via telegraph cables was still better. The very act of written communication ensured that Hollywood studios could collect information about foreign settings while also promoting Hollywood practices. For David O. Selznick’s *A Farewell to Arms* (1957), the camera crew was having difficulty with achieving a range of technical issues, including shooting close-ups and performing camera movements with the new CinemaScope format. Twentieth Century-Fox then communicated by telegraph with Selznick, who was on location in Italy, on how to work through the shooting problems.⁹⁸

With all of these acts of sharing information by correspondence, Hollywood studios were generating important written records of production knowledge that future personnel could consult. When location work on *Little Boy Lost* wrapped in France, production manager Bill Mull wrote a lengthy summary of the strategies for operating in Paris.⁹⁹ Subsequently, in preparing to shoot *To Catch a Thief* in France, “Doc” Erickson studied the correspondence to gain insights into the process of acquiring shooting permits and dealing with French unions.¹⁰⁰ In fact, Erickson made the case that *Little Boy Lost* functioned as a test run to orient future Paramount staff members who managed foreign shoots in subsequent years.¹⁰¹ The communication between Hollywood studios and their location units thus became both a medium for the conveyance of trade knowledge and a running record of how to mount these productions. The flow of production knowledge through written correspondence also became a valuable way for studios to supervise their international film units.

**STUDIO SUPERVISION**

For some Hollywood filmmakers who craved independence, the freedom from studio interference was certainly a viable inducement for working on overseas productions. On the film *Jessica*, a Franco-Italian coproduction with United Artists, director Jean Negulesco expressed that he had almost complete organizational autonomy, handling many aspects of the film, from location scouting to production management. In the abovementioned letter to Vincente Minnelli, Negulesco goes on to explain, “It is a difficult and arduous job. I have never had so much to do, so much to think and so much to check, recheck, but the satisfaction of being able to make immediate decisions without waiting for an okay and even being in the ‘in’ of everything, it has excited me.”¹⁰² For both independent filmmakers like Negulesco and
studio-contract directors like Minnelli, working abroad seemed to promise escape from studio suits, who back home usually supervised the details of production, from budgeting matters to the number of takes a director shot. But exactly how much freedom did Hollywood filmmakers working overseas have from studio supervision?

Whether in production centers in London, Rome, Paris, or other locations around the globe, film units could avoid the watchful eyes of studio executives and managers. Because of the distance from the Hollywood studio, the film unit working on a foreign location not only had more responsibilities but also operated with more autonomy. Production manager “Doc” Erickson explained:

You didn’t have to answer to anybody. If you’re in Hollywood, you’ve got to pay attention to the production office hourly, daily. They expected it and you responded accordingly. But once you get out of their clutches, you’re pretty much on your own. You can make your own decisions. You don’t have to run to the phone immediately and say what do you think about this? What do you think about that? So that’s the difference. And you were accorded that respect from the locals, the people you’re working with, because they know you’re the boss. They’re not going to have to worry about somebody else countermanding your orders.

Erickson described that while filmmakers had a certain amount of leeway working on domestic locations, those units were still “handcuffed to the studio” through frequent updates via telephone and the presence of studio personnel.

In a best-case scenario, Hollywood personnel working abroad could have access to Hollywood-size budgets and organizational might while trying out technical experiments that were easier to attain overseas. On *Moulin Rouge* (1953), John Huston harnessed the talents of Oswald Morris to come up with an unconventional use of Technicolor. Morris experimented with smoke, filters, and temperature at Shepperton Studios to achieve a bold play of colors associated with Toulouse-Lautrec’s artwork in a way that the cinematographer said would have not been possible in Hollywood. The results so startled the British staff of Technicolor that they first wanted their firm’s name disassociated from the film until it met with success.

In the worst case, shooting off the lot and without the careful supervision of budget-minded executives could result in production costs spiraling out of control, as was the case with *Mutiny on the Bounty* (1962) and *Cleopatra* (1963). On the production of *The Inn of the Sixth Happiness* (1958), which was
renting out MGM-British Studios, producer-director Mark Robson wrote to Fox executive Buddy Adler to complain that the British production department had significantly added to the budget because of accounting carelessness and cost increases. Angrily, Robson blamed Fox’s British production operation for its negligence. By shooting far away from Hollywood, such inattention could happen, and it took a reliable journeyman like Robson to alert the studio and call for an audit of all spending. Robson summed up, “I cannot tell you how I miss the efficiency and planning of our Hollywood production and budgeting department, because here this is a NIGHTMARE.”

For some scholars, notions of freedom explain Hollywood filmmakers’ desire to shoot overseas in the postwar era. In *Hollyworld: Space, Power, and Fantasy in the American Economy* (2001), Aida Hozic argues that postwar location shooting brought filmmakers greater creative freedom, especially foreign location shoots, where the sheer physical distance from Hollywood diminished the power of the studio-based executive and producer to shape the production process: “The spatial expansion of production reduced the ability of Hollywood producers to both monitor the flow of production and control expenditures incurred on location.” In their study on global film production in *The Film Studio* (2005), Ben Goldsmith and Tom O’Regan similarly maintain, “In the 1950s and 1960s, ‘going on location’ (or location thinking) offered the promise of creative and financial freedom afforded by distance from Hollywood.”

While a studio’s moment-to-moment vigilance concerning logistical and creative decisions was weakened on international productions, a closer look into the realities of foreign shoots reveals a more nuanced relationship between the Hollywood studio and the satellite film unit. What emerges is not a picture of filmmakers running away from the control of studio executives, but one of constant negotiation. Los Angeles–based studios attempted to promote Hollywood-style production standards from afar, as location film units tried to execute these directives against the pressure of new shooting conditions. Studios used several methods to supervise their film units abroad, which increased the likelihood that Hollywood production protocols would be followed. These methods included set visits by studio executives and managers; on-set proxies who represented the studios and reported back to them; cables and letters between the location unit and the Hollywood studio; and the decision to screen dailies in Hollywood before the filmmakers on location saw them.
With the growing ease of commercial airline travel in the 1950s, studio executives and production heads could fly to foreign locations to check on their companies’ projects. Before Darryl Zanuck left Fox to become an independent producer in Europe, he was heavily involved in the studio’s overseas productions, visiting active units throughout the world. In 1949 he used his studio’s private C-47 plane to travel to London, Paris, Berlin, and Morocco, where Fox was engaged in five productions. Likewise, the heads of Warner Bros., Republic, and Allied Artists all kept an eye on the planning and execution of their studios’ productions abroad by dropping in on foreign locations. However, visits from studio executives did not always guarantee a tight rein on filmmaking. Even though Fox executives went to Rome to keep track of spending, Cleopatra became the most expensive film up to that time due to aborted production plans in London, excessive building expenditures, and shooting delays associated with star Elizabeth Taylor’s health.

Compared to studio films, independent productions could appear to have more freedom from the supervision of their Hollywood financiers and distributors, but they were still somewhat beholden to Hollywood studios. Arthur Krim, head of United Artists, traveled to Europe to survey the various productions that his company was financing, including Sam Spiegel’s Melba (1953) and Raymond Stross’s Shoot First (1953), both filming in London. He also looked in on the Paris shoots of Act of Love and Moulin Rouge. During Selznick’s production of A Farewell to Arms, the film’s coproducer and financier, Twentieth Century-Fox, was involved in making decisions about acquiring equipment and hiring labor in Italy.

Studios also used on-location representatives to stay up to date on the latest shooting developments. For the complicated production of Quo Vadis, MGM had general manager Eddie Mannix supervise the troubled preproduction and early filming period, until the picture was on track. Mannix replicated this supervision during the preproduction of Ben-Hur. Once production commenced, a string of other MGM executives followed with set visits. Art director Edward Carfagno recollected that when Ben-Hur director William Wyler fell behind schedule, studio representatives traveled “to push him on.” For the productions of Captain Horatio Hornblower and The Crimson Pirate (1952), Teddington Studios manager Gerry Blattner kept Warner Bros. in Burbank informed on a range of matters, including shooting progress and hiring crew members. Supervision by proxy helped to keep overseas productions running along the lines of a Hollywood studio.
Beyond personal contact, studios relayed their supervisory role through two important means. First, communication via letter and cable was key to ensuring that studio managers in Hollywood were informed of hiring, delays, and, most importantly, spending. In a letter to *Little Boy Lost* unit manager Bill Mull, Paramount’s production manager Frank Caffey implored from Hollywood, “Please arrange to drop me a note religiously once a week as of course I am asked questions continuously.” Caffey’s request suggests that he needed the foreign unit to be in constant contact with him because of his own accountability to his superiors. The other way to monitor production from a distance was to develop footage shot overseas in Hollywood, where executives and editors could then watch dailies to track filming progress and quality. On the Italian shoot of *Prince of Foxes*, Twentieth Century-Fox could have developed the dailies in the labs of Shepperton Studios, where the rushes for Fox’s *I Was a Male War Bride* (1949) and *The Forbidden Street* (1949) were being processed. Instead, they were developed in Los Angeles to allow Darryl Zanuck to see the shooting results first.

When wide-screen technologies were introduced, dailies became an effective way for studios to see how foreign units were handling the new format. With the advent of VistaVision, Paramount was particularly concerned with controlling how foreign location units employed its wide-screen process. The studio even attempted to shape the visual style of directors as authoritative as Alfred Hitchcock. When Hitchcock and his crew went to the south of France to shoot *To Catch a Thief*, the VistaVision process was still relatively new, having first been used a year earlier on Paramount’s *White Christmas* (1954). The exposed footage of *To Catch a Thief* was processed at Technicolor in London, and then the dailies were shipped back to Hollywood, where Paramount personnel watched what was shot. Because the projection of VistaVision films had not yet been fully standardized in commercial cinemas, the studio cabled the French location unit that they needed to compose shots somewhat loosely for the 1.85 aspect ratio so that human figures would also fit within a 1.66 ratio. At the same time, Paramount wanted to ensure that the crew was filming with enough light to render shots in sharp focus, as VistaVision’s benefit was its ability to produce great definition in the negative. Cinematographer Robert Burks expressed concern that maintaining the backgrounds in sharp focus would be difficult because of Hitchcock’s desire to capture “dramatic” close-ups. In later years, Hitchcock articu-
lated his thinking on how to shoot close-ups and asserted, “My argument has always been: Who wants to see around the close-up? Why should it be sharp behind the close-up? But there was always this aim, and this seemed to me to create an unreal effect—this yearning for the modeled figure, and this separation of the image from background.”

After the dailies of *To Catch a Thief* were reviewed at Paramount, studio production manager Frank Caffey cabled the French unit to express that the soft focus in the background of the close-up shots was “disturbing.” He also advocated for waist-high framing captured with medium-focal-length lenses instead of shooting close-ups. Throughout the production, Paramount pointed out the softness of some of the shots’ backgrounds, noting that the scenes wouldn’t cut together well. Production manager “Doc” Erickson conveyed back to Paramount Hitchcock’s concern over the studio’s fixation on the shallow focus in the close-ups: “[Hitchcock] finds it very hard to believe that you can put across certain story points without actual close-ups.”

Even though Hitchcock was resolute in his use of close-ups, additional wider shots and background plates were captured for protection. While Erickson has suggested that Hitchcock did not heed the studio’s advice, long shots are the most frequent framing in the movie. Barry Salt’s statistical analysis of Hitchcock’s shot scales reveals that the director did in fact move away from close-ups in favor of more distant shots in his first three VistaVision motion pictures, starting with *To Catch a Thief*. The resulting look of the film is evidence that for a director like Hitchcock, the studio could influence precise matters of style even as the distance between studios and location units was growing on international productions. The back-and-forth correspondence also indicates how a studio’s supervision of overseas filmmaking could promote Hollywood stylistic conventions.

Ultimately, though, studios were more concerned with costs than the details of creative decisions on foreign shoots. In spite of the lack of day-to-day supervision, Hollywood filmmakers working abroad still adhered to the aesthetic norms of their domestic industry, even if certain stylistic features, namely location shooting, became more predominant on these productions. Whether they were journeymen such as *Little Boy Lost* director George Seaton or established masters such as Vincente Minnelli, these moviemakers depended on the creative solutions for big-budget filmmaking they had employed for decades in the studio system, especially in the face of the challenges of international production work.
While Hollywood had long thought globally in terms of its distribution reach, its postwar foreign film activity illustrates the intensification of a more international approach to production. Because of economic incentives, production infrastructure, and skilled film workers, the UK, Italy, and France became key staging grounds for Hollywood’s move into overseas filmmaking. Meanwhile, changes were also taking place in the United States. Studios were cutting overhead as production was moving off the lot to locations across the country, a move that prompted adjustments in craft practices, as producers drew from a growing freelance labor pool. Overseas, these changes were amplified. Through Hollywood companies’ ability to manage these changes and continue certain established filmmaking practices, the industry grew its international presence.

In the long run, the production centers of London, Rome, and to a lesser extent Paris profited from Hollywood’s postwar investment in their labor and infrastructure. However, Hollywood’s involvement in these production centers met some resistance. As noted above, labor groups in the UK, Italy, and France took issue with certain Hollywood film shoots in order to protect their jobs and pay. Italian director Roberto Rossellini delivered a more widespread complaint that Hollywood companies were driving up production expenses in the already-troubled Italian industry by inflating costs for studios, equipment, and labor. Even some non-Italian producers criticized the increase in costs. Independent producer Gregor Rabinovitch accused Fox of overpaying Italian workers for its production of *Prince of Foxes*, making it more difficult for both Italian producers and Hollywood independents to finance filmmaking in Italy.

In response, Darryl Zanuck defended these pay increases as a means to hire the best technicians possible and to pay a scale worthy of Fox, despite admitting to a huge savings in costs: “If any other producer or company wants to compete with us for the best Italian labor, he cannot expect to do it on a cut-rate wage scale, because 20th-Fox will not stoop to sweat-shop practices. We are not in Italy for the purpose of exploiting Italian labor or to make a ‘Quickie’ to cash in on another country’s depressed condition.” Along these lines, correspondence for MGM’s production of *Quo Vadis* suggests that the studio tried its best to not “derogue from the standard scales”
and to work through Cinecittà’s employment office when securing Italian labor.\textsuperscript{136} The Italian government also tried to keep US companies from distorting local costs in order to avoid adversely affecting Italian companies trying to produce films.\textsuperscript{137}

Production costs, in time, did rise in Italy due to the expensive epic films that Hollywood was producing.\textsuperscript{138} From 1950 to 1952, \textit{Daily Variety} reported, the price of film equipment and labor in Italy rose by one-third.\textsuperscript{139} Producer Ilya Lopert complained that from 1948 to 1954, production costs had quadrupled.\textsuperscript{140} By 1956, director Robert Rossen claimed that there was very little difference in production spending between Italy and the United States.\textsuperscript{141} The Motion Picture Export Association also recognized the increasing cost of making films in Italy, but attributed the problem to a series of local conditions, including disorganized shoots, the high cost of Italian stars, an inflated Italian economy, and a time lag between production and the doling out of subsidies.\textsuperscript{142} The Italian criticism lobbed against Hollywood continued into the 1960s, when two Italian newspapers were reported to have attacked the US industry for raising production costs to levels that local producers could not meet, along with enacting various unfair competitive strategies.\textsuperscript{143}

In France, the industry took an ambivalent stance toward Hollywood productions. From one perspective, French studios and technicians felt that Hollywood films kept local technicians employed and well paid, and rarely took valuable studio space and equipment away from local films. From another perspective, some French producers and film unions felt that money made in the French market should be applied toward true French films rather than Hollywood films or Franco-US coproductions. French producers also feared that Hollywood’s penchant for paying above wage scales could drive up production costs in their country. A general anti-Hollywood stance undergirded these attitudes, reinforced by vocal Communist groups that blamed the French industry’s financial woes on the inundation of US films in France.\textsuperscript{144}

Hollywood’s involvement with the industries of the UK, Italy, and France can be understood through a dynamic of collaboration, compliance, and resistance from all sides. Hollywood productions ushered in pivotal changes to European film industries by bringing them into contact with US companies and financing, introducing new technologies, fostering coproduction deals, and contributing to the rebuilding of an infrastructure that had suffered during the war. Even if foreign industries profited from these activities,
they were primarily undertaken out of Hollywood’s self-interest so that it could build an overseas production network. Through a process of continuing Hollywood practices and adapting to foreign industries, Hollywood expanded its international production reach in order to navigate the changing industrial and cultural climates of the postwar era.
3. LUMIÈRE, CAMERA, AZIONE!: THE PERSONNEL AND
PRactices OF hOLLYWOOD’S MODE OF INTERNATIONAL
PRODUCTION


5. C.O. Erickson to Frank Caffey, May 23, 1954, *To Catch a Thief* (Pre-
Production Location 1953–1954), Paramount Pictures Production Records, AMPAS
Library.

6. Hugh Brown to C.O. Erickson, May 28, 1954, *To Catch a Thief* (Pre-
Production Location 1953–1954), Paramount Pictures Production Records, AMPAS
Library.

Paramount Pictures Production Records, AMPAS Library.

8. Various correspondence for *Crack in the Mirror*, Twentieth Century-Fox
Production Files, Performing Arts Special Collections, UCLA, Los Angeles (here-
after UCLA Arts).

Reporter*, May 21, 1953, 1, 4.

Cinematographer*, November 1951, 448.

“Lensers Demand H’wood Crews on U.S.-Originated Pix O’Seas,” *Daily Variety*,
March 21, 1958, 6.

1954, 22; Vic Heutschy, “From Any Angle,” *International Photographer*, January
1955, 8; Robert Tobey, “Letter from Cairo,” *International Photographer*, February
1955, 12.

13. Darryl Zanuck to Fox staff, September 14, 1948, Miscellaneous (Correspond-
ence), Charles Schlaifer Collection, AMPAS Library.

15, 1948, 3.

15. Jonathan Stubbs, “‘Blocked’ Currency, Runaway Production in Britain and
*Captain Horatio Hornblower* (1951),” *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Televis-
ion* 28, no. 3 (August 2008): 335.


“Unemployment Highest for 10 Years,” *The Cine-Technician*, March–April 1948,
63, 65.

26, 1948, 1, 15; “No Ban on H’d Art Directors in England,” *Daily Variety*, July 1,

19. “June Motion Picture Report—United Kingdom,” July 7, 1950, Great Britain
Motion Pictures (1950–1954), State Department Files, National Archives and
Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (hereafter NARA).

20. Quoted in Joseph Ruttenberg, “Assignment Overseas,” *American Cinemato-
grapher*, October 1950, 355.

7, 1948, 1, 9.


33. Gianni Manca, “Certain Relevant Aspects of the Production of Films in Italy by Foreign Producers,” in *Syllabus and Forms on American Motion Picture Production in Foreign Countries*, 20.

35. W. N. Walmsley Jr. to the secretary of state, June 11, 1949, Italy Motion Pictures (1945–1949), State Department Files, NARA.
48. Of course, language barriers were rarely a problem in the UK, one reason why Hollywood was attracted to working in that region, so my analysis mainly focuses on communication in Italy and France.
65. Alberto Morin to John Huston, February 4, 1949, *Quo Vadis* (Staff), John Huston Papers, AMPAS Library. In the end, Morin does not seem to have worked on *Quo Vadis*.


74. “Rapid ‘Quo Vadis’ Progress Reported by Film’s Scribe,” *Daily Variety*, July 14, 1950, 10.


82. Bertram Tuttle to Steve Trilling, April 27, 1950, *Captain Horatio Hornblower* (Steve Trilling Files), Warner Archive.


93. “Zanuck to London for Prod’n Parley,” *Daily Variety*, November 19, 1954, 1, 3. However, the first CinemaScope production in Britain was MGM’s *Knights of the Round Table* (1954).


96. Humphrey Bogart shares an anecdote about the difficulties of trying to communicate by phone from the Italian town of Ravello during the production of *Beat the Devil* (1954) in Humphrey Bogart as told to Joe Hyams, “Movie Making Beats the Devil,” *Cue*, November 28, 1953, 15.


98. Cable correspondence between David O. Selznick and Sid Rogell, June 20 and July 15, 1957, *A Farewell to Arms*, Twentieth Century-Fox Production Files, UCLA Arts.


104. C. O. Erickson, interview with author, December 17, 2011.


106. Oswald Morris, interview with author, April 21, 2011.


108. Mark Robson to Buddy Adler, April 23, 1958, *The Inn of the Sixth Happiness*, Mark Robson Papers, UCLA Arts, capitals in original.


115. Various correspondence, *A Farewell to Arms*, Twentieth Century-Fox Production Files, UCLA Arts.


119. Various correspondence, *Captain Horatio Hornblower* (Steve Trilling Files) and *The Crimson Pirate* (Steve Trilling Files), Warner Archive.


122. C. O. Erickson, interview with author, December 17, 2011.


125. Robert Burks’s concern was relayed in C. O. Erickson to Frank Caffey, June 1, 1954, *To Catch a Thief* (Production Location 1954), Paramount Pictures Production Records, AMPAS Library.


127. Frank Caffey to C. O. Erickson, June 1, 1954, *To Catch a Thief* (Production Location 1954), Paramount Pictures Production Records, AMPAS Library.


131. C. O. Erickson, interview with author, December 17, 2011.


134. “20th Accused of Raising Film Costs in Italy,” *Daily Variety*, September 13, 1948, 4. However, in his interview with this author (March 22, 2011, Rome), veteran set dresser Bruno Schiavi remembered that Italian unions set the wage scales, which avoided the potential for inflated payments. This regulation was possibly instituted well after 1948.

136. L.C. Algrant to Henry Henigson, April 7, 1949, *Quo Vadis* (Correspondence), John Huston Papers, AMPAS Library.


